Although it takes O(n 2 ) worst-case time to solve a stable marriage problem instance with n men and n women, a trivial O(n) algorithm suffices if all men are known to have identical preference lists and all women also are known to have identical preference lists. Since real-world instances often involve men or women with similar but not necessarily identical preference lists, this motivates us to introduce the notion of an adaptive stable marriage algorithm -an algorithm whose running time is of the form O(n + k), where k describes the aggregate amount of disagreement between the preference lists in our instance versus a pair of specified "consensus" preference lists, one for the men and one for women. The running time of an adaptive stable matching algorithm therefore gracefully scales from O(n 2 ) in the worse case down to O(n) in the case where preference lists are all in close agreement. We show how the O(n + k) running time bound can be achieved if all women are known to have identical preference lists, leaving the case where both men and women can have non-identical but similar preference lists as an open question. We also show how this special case may serve as a good model for sports drafts.
INTRODUCTION
The most common measure used for describing the performance of an algorithm is its worst-case asymptotic running time in terms of its input size. However, for many problems, there are other natural measures of inherent complexity that can also be used to quantify algorithmic performance more precisely. For example, the worst-case running time of inPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ACMSE '10, April 15-17, 2010, Oxford, MS, USA. , but a more precise analysis shows that the running time is actually Θ(n + I), where I denotes the number of inversions in the input array -"out of order" pairs of elements (i, j) with i < j but A[i] > A [j] . Therefore, the running time of insertion sort scales gracefully between O(n) and O(n 2 ), depending on the inherent "unsortedness" of A measured in terms of inversions. Mehlhorn [8] coined the term adaptive to describe such an algorithm, whose performance scales gracefully depending some specific measurement of problem complexity other than just size; we would say that insertion sort is adaptive with respect to inversions. Adaptivity has been studied extensively in particular for sorting algorithms, based not only on inversions but many other measures of unsortedness; see the detailed survey of Estivill-Castro and Wood [1] for complete details.
Inspired by the strong results achievable by adaptivity for sorting, we introduce in this paper the first application of adaptive algorithms in the domain of stable marriage problems. The input to a stable marriage problem is a set of n men and n women, each of whom submits a ranked preference list over all members of the opposite sex. The goal of the problem is to compute a stable pairing between the men and women, so that no unmatched man-woman pair (m, w) forms a so-called blocking pair, where man m prefers woman w to his assigned partner, and woman w prefers man m to her assigned partner. The stable marriage problem was first introduced in 1962 by Gale and Shapley [2] , who showed that a stable matching exists for any input instance, and who provided a simple algorithm for computing such a matching (see also [7] ). In the past few decades, stable matching problems and algorithms have been studied in depth in the literature. Gusfield and Irving have authored an excellent book summarizing major results in this area [3] .
Although the Gale-Shapley algorithm often runs quite fast in practice, often in nearly linear time, it carries a worstcase running time of Θ(n 2 ). In fact, as shown by Gusfield and Irving [3] , any stable marriage algorithm must have a worst-case running time of Ω(n 2 ), due to the fact that an adversary can force us to look at most of the input of the problem (2n preference lists, each of length n), which has size Θ(nsimplicity, let us assume the women are ordered according to the preference list of the men, and vice versa. Hence, man 1 and woman 1 are both their own respective first choices, and therefore both must be matched together in any stable assignment (otherwise they would form a blocking pair). Continuing in an inductive fashion, we see that man 2 and woman 2 must be matched, and so on, leading to a trivial O(n) algorithm for the special case where we are told in advance that all men share a common preference list, and all women share a common preference list. For notational simplicity, let us say that a stable marriage instance is M -consistent if it contains only one common preference list shared by all men, W -consistent if it contains one common preference list shared by all women, and M W -consistent if both of these cases apply.
It is unrealistic to expect full M W -consistency for many instances of the stable marriage problem in practice. However, we argue that it may be reasonable to encounter instances that are nearly M W -consistent, with each man's preference list deviating only slightly from a global "consensus" list shared among all men, and likewise for the women. For example, a prominent application of stable marriage in practice is the assignment of medical school graduates to hospitals. Each year in the USA, more than 30,000 medical school graduates are assigned to hospitals through a centralized service called the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [9, 10, 11] . Although the preference lists submitted to this system are (for obvious reasons) confidential, one might expect highly reputable or geographically advantageous schools to appear near the top of a large number of graduate preference lists, and likewise, one might expect the strongest graduates to appear near the top of a large number of hospital preference lists. We can encode a nearly-M Wconsistent instance as follows. For the men, we first specify a global "consensus" preference list, and then for each individual, we list only the entries in his preference list that differ from the consensus list (e.g., "entry 7 is changed to women 2, and entry 9 is changed to woman 5"). Preference lists of the women are encoded the same way. If we let k denote the total number of differing entries over all men and women, this entire encoding requires Θ(n + k) space, ranging from Θ(n) if we have complete M W -consistency, up to Θ(n 2 ) if preference lists are highly inconsistent.
The succinct encoding above raises the question of whether or not one can design an adaptive algorithm for the stable marriage problem running in only O(n + k) time. Note that this type of adaptive algorithm result would be slightly weaker than, say, an adaptive sorting algorithm, since we still need to explicitly encode the input of the problem as above in order for the algorithm to be able to exploit partial M W consistency (in contrast to an adaptive sorting algorithm, which is not told any extra structural information beyond just the array to be sorted). However, with the stable marriage problem, succinct encoding is an unavoidable requirement -even if we have complete M W consistency, an algorithm cannot leverage this fact unless it is informed about it in advance; otherwise, it may still need to examine essentially all of its Θ(n 2 )-size input. Hence, a partially M W -consistent instance is only of use to us if it is succinctly encoded 1 .
The main result of this paper is an O(n + k) adaptive algorithm for succinctly-encoded W -consistent instances of the stable marriage problem. While this falls short of the goal of achieving an O(n + k) running time for any succinctlyencoded instance (which we leave as an open problem), this special case may be interesting in its own right, for example as a model for a sports draft problem, such as that used by the NFL. Here, the women's side contains consistent preference lists that represent the order in which teams make their draft picks, while the women themselves become the players. This behavior is realistic in that the players themselves don't (or at least shouldn't) have a say in who drafts them, instead agreeing to play for whichever team drafts them in a predetermined order. The men correspond to the teams in the draft, each choosing the highest player in his list when his turn comes. Since there is typically a global understanding of which players are strongest and which are not, we expect most men (teams) to have very similar preference lists. Obviously, this model is somewhat simplified from many actual drafts.
In the next section, we define notation and introduce preliminary ideas. Next, we present our algorithm and show how it generates a stable solution to a succinctly-encoded W -consistent instance. Finally, we offer remarks on the more general (and seemingly much more difficult) non-Wconsistent case as well as other directions that could serve as the focus of future research.
PRELIMINARIES
Consider a succinctly-encoded W -consistent instance of the stable marriage problem with n men and n women. We number the women 1 . . . n in the order of the consensus preference list of the men, and likewise we number the men 1 . . . n in the order specified by the consensus preference list of the women (if the men and/or women are not ordered this way initially in our input, then it only takes O(n) time to re-order them accordingly). The consensus preference list of the men now lists all women in the order 1, 2, . . . n, and the consensus preference list for the women now lists all men in the order 1, 2, . . . , n. Since our instance is W -consistent, only the men can have changes in their preference lists deviating from the consensus list. We encode the changes away from the consensus list for man m using a list Cm of ordered pairs (i, w), where each such pair indicates that index i in m's preference list is changed to woman w (note that i = w, since i = w in the consensus list). We denote the total amount of change in all of the men's preferences by k = P m |Cm|.
A matching M is a subset of n man-woman pairs (m, w) such that no two pairs share a common man or woman. We write wM(m) to denote the woman partnered with m in M, and similarly we write mM(w) to denote the man partnered with woman w (when clear from context, we often omit the M subscript). A matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair (m, w) / ∈ M where m prefers w to wM(m) and w prefers m to mM(w).
The Gale-Shapley algorithm [2] consists of a series of proposals from the men to the women. In each iteration, an unassigned man proposes to the next woman on his preference list. Each woman tentatively accepts the best proposal she receives during the process. If an engaged woman receives a proposal from a man she prefers to her current tentative partner, she rejects her current partner and tentatively accepts the incoming proposal (after which her former partner joins the ranks of the unmatched men, and proceeds in a future iteration to issue proposals to women further down his preference list in sequence). It is straightforward to prove that this process ultimately produces a matching of all the men and women that is stable.
For the special case we consider where all women share the same preference list 1, 2, . . . , n, a simpler variant of the GaleShapley algorithm can be used, in which all proposals are permanently accepted with no subsequent rejections. Here, each man m = 1 . . . n in sequence proposes to the first unmatched woman on his preference list, and is permanently accepted by this woman. It is easy to argue by induction not only that this process produces a stable matching, but that it also produces the only possible stable matching (whereas for a general instance, many stable matchings can exist). This follows from the fact that man 1 and his first choice woman are both their respective top preferences, so this couple would be a blocking pair unless they are matched together. The remainder of the argument follows inductively. The algorithm we develop in this paper is a carefullyimplemented refinement of this process.
THE ALGORITHM
The key idea of our algorithm is to speed up the implementation of the simplified Gale-Shapley algorithm above by keeping track of the set of women who are not yet assigned, but who should have been chosen already if the men had identical preference lists. If all men shared the same preference list 1, 2, . . . , n, then by the time our algorithm considered man m, we would have already assigned man i with woman i for i = 1 . . . m − 1. Hence, we keep track of a list R, stored in a doubly-linked list, which in iteration m keeps a sorted list of all the women in the set {1, . . . , m} who are still single (the array R may also end up containing some women who are assigned, but these are cleaned out of from R whenever they are encountered). When considering the partner to whom man m should propose, this will either be one of the women in Cm, or it will be the first single woman in R who is not also in Cm.
The pseudocode in Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the algorithm. We make use of a boolean array S[ Observe that the algorithm assigns each man m to a woman either from his change list Cm in line 9, or alternatively he is assigned in line 16 to his most-preferred woman in R (who is not also in Cm). It is important to note that at least one of these two cases always applies, so each man must end up assigned a partner. If Cm is empty, then line 16 will definitely be triggered for at least one woman in R, since by the time we process man m, we will have added m entries to R but deleted at most m − 1 of them, leaving at least one single woman still present in R.
Theorem 1. Our algorithm runs in Θ(n + k) time.
Proof. Discounting the "for" loop starting on line 11, it is clear that for each man m, we spend only linear time checking the entries in Cm, for a total of O(n + P m |Cm|) = O(n + k) time. To analyze the "for" loop starting in line 11, we note that the amount of time spent deleting entries from R (line 13) will be at most O(n) over the entire algorithm, since each woman is added and hence also deleted at most once from R. Not counting the time spent on entries of R that are deleted, the "for" loop on line 11 spends O(1 + q) time, where q denotes the number of entries w in R with T [w] = True (since we break the loop immediately when we encounter an entry w with T [w] = False). However, since q ≤ |Cm|, the work spent in the for loop is dominated by the running time of the rest of the algorithm.
It is crucial that we break the "for" loop starting in line 11 immediately upon reaching an entry w in R with T [w] = False, since the list R can grow quite long; for example, in an instance where Cm contains (1, n−m+1) for all m = 1 . . . n, R grows each iteration until m = n/2.
Theorem 2. Our algorithm computes a stable matching.
Proof. To prove this, we need only show that every man m proposes to the first single woman in his preference list; stability then follows from our earlier inductive argument. Consider now the point in time when our algorithm processes some man m, and let L denote the first m women on m's preference list. We claim that at least one of the women in L must still be single, since at most m − 1 women have already been assigned. The women in L with S[w] = True are either entries from Cm (all of which are explicitly checked by our algorithm), or they belong to {1, 2, . . . , m}, all of which have previously been added to the list R by line 4; moreover, every women w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} with S[w] = True must still remain in R, since only women w with S[w] = False are deleted from R. Among these, our algorithm explicitly examines the one most highly preferred by m. As a result, while processing m, our algorithm must consider (and issue a proposal to) the most preferred single woman w ∈ L.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The adaptive stable marriage model introduced in this paper leads to a number of interesting directions for future research. Foremost, there is the question of whether an algorithm with complexity close to O(n + k) can be developed for the fully-general adaptive stable marriage problem, not assuming W -consistency as we have above. This problem seems to be quite challenging, since when changes appear in preference lists on both sides of the instance, we can lose much of the useful structure that our algorithm manages to exploit. If it seems that an efficient algorithm is possible for the general case, then a number of other problems stand to be addressed. In particular, there may no longer be a single unique stable solution, so one might want to see if it is possible to compute the rotation DAG that implicitly describes the set of all stable solutions in an efficient manner (see [4, 5, 6] for additional detail on the underlying structure of the set of all stable solutions).
One fairly simple extension we can build on our algorithm is the ability to accommodate multiple consensus lists for the men. That is, we specify c different consensus lists as input, and each man m specifies which consensus list his preference is using for its basis, in addition to the list Cm of changes on top of this list. To modify our algorithm properly, we use c different lists R1 . . . Rc instead of the single R lists. In line 4, we append the mth entry in the ith consensus list to Ri, for all i = 1 . . . c. In the loop starting on line 11, we use only look through the list Ri corresponding to man m's particular consensus list. The total running time of the extended algorithm is O(nc + k), only a modest slowdown. Correctness of the algorithm follows essentially the same analysis as the previous case with only a single consensus list.
Another interesting direction (which we believe also seems quite challenging) might be to approach the problem from a "data structure" perspective. For example, can one encode the state of a computation in an appropriate fashion so that after making a single new change (say, a single swap in one of the preference lists), a new stable solution can be recomputed more quickly than by solving the problem again from scratch? It is worth noting that a single swap in one preference list has the potential to change the assignment for every single man and woman, so a data structure solving this problem will likely need to maintain some sort of implicit encoding of the solution, which we can query to determine the current state of the assignment.
Stable marriage problems with incomplete preference lists, or with preference lists containing ties, have been well-studied in the literature (see, e.g., [3] ). Perhaps results for these variants can also be extended to work in the adaptive case.
As mentioned earlier, the W -consistent case of the stable marriage problem can resemble a sports draft. This model can be generalized in several ways, leading to other problem formulations that may also be of interest, since significant amounts of money are usually involved with sports drafts. For example, one simple variant would involve a matching in which a team is able to choose multiple players similar to the multiple rounds in a draft; this problem is similar to the college admissions problem presented by Gale and Shapley, where each college tries to fill a quota of applicants [2] .
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